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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper tests a popular but previously untested proposition about the behaviour of 
the stock market. The proposition is that when the market changes direction after a 
period of trending prices, the magnitude and duration of the next trend is not random, 
but depends on the magnitude and duration of the previous trend. Specifically we are 
interested in whether the ratios of successive trends cluster around Fibonacci ratios or 
“round numbers”.  
The idea that price trends may be arrested at predictable support and resistance levels 
is one of many tools used by technical analysts. Technical analysis – the prediction of 
turning points in financial markets by chart-based methods - has long been popular 
among practitioners, but viewed with suspicion by academics. Burton Malkiel, in his 
classic book writes, among many similarly cutting remarks - “Technical strategies are 
usually amusing, often comforting, but of no real value” (Malkiel, 1996, p161). 
The root of the problem is the failure of technical analysts to specify their trading 
rules and report trading results in a scientifically acceptable way. Too often, rules are 
so vague or complex as to make replication impossible. Too often popular texts 
contain dramatic examples of successful predictions of turning points, with no count 
of misses or false alarms. Recently, however, academics have begun to look 
systematically at some of the more easily replicable technical trading rules. Park and 
Irwin (2004) provide a comprehensive review of these studies. Of 92 studies 
published in the period 1988-2004, 58 reported positive excess profits from a 
technical rule, 10 yielded mixed results, and 24 reported losses. Even allowing for a 
bias towards publishing positive results, and the possibility that not all studies 
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properly accounted for transactions costs and risk, this does suggest that not all of 
technical analysis can be dismissed prima facie. 
The paper falls into four sections. Section 2 below introduces our hypothesis and 
reviews relevant research findings.  Section 3 introduces our data – high/low/open 
close prices for the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the years 1914-2002 - and 
develops a method for identifying turning points in range data based on Pagan and 
Soussonov (2003). Section 4 reports the resulting distributions of price and time ratios 
for successive trends, and compares them to distributions that would be expected to 
occur by chance using the Politis and Romano (1994) stationary block bootstrap 
methodology, again modified for the special features of our data.  
2. SUPPORT, RESISTANCE AND FIBONACCI NUMBERS 
The popularity of technical analysis among market practitioners is evident from any 
casual reading of the financial press and the many web-based financial information 
services, and has been widely documented. Allen and Taylor (1992) and Lui and 
Mole (1998) find that technical analysis is used as a primary or secondary method of 
forecasting market trends by ninety per cent of players in the foreign exchange 
market. A third of currency traders rely on technical techniques exclusively (Cheung 
and Chinn, 1999 and Cheung and Wong, 1999).  
Technical analysis itself is an umbrella term for a heterogeneous set of techniques, 
some relying on visual recognition of chart patterns, others on values of statistical 
indicators calculated from recent price or volume data. Many practitioner books 
describe these techniques, most prominently Achelis (2000), Murphy (2000), Edwards 
and Magee (2001), and Pring (1998). Neely (1997) provides a readable academic 
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summary. Academic research has focussed on the profitability of trading on 
mechanical technical indicators. Many early studies investigate filter rules that require 
a trader to go long if price rises more than k% above the most recent low price, and 
vice versa. Examples are the classic stock market studies of stock market efficiency 
by Alexander (1961) and Fama and Blume (1966), and the contrary finding of 
profitable filter rules in currency markets by Sweeney (1986) and Levich and Thomas 
(1993). More recent studies investigate moving average rules that require the trader to 
go long or short if the current price (or short term moving average of price) is above 
or below a long term moving average. LeBaron (1999) finds evidence that this 
generates profits in currency markets. Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) claim 
to find profits from applying moving average rules to the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, though this is disputed by Sullivan, Timmerman and White (1999). A 
smaller number of studies evaluate pattern-based trades. Some look at trendline 
breaking rules that require the trader to buy or sell if the price breaks above some 
overhead resistance level, or falls through some lower support level (see for example 
Curcio, Guillaume, Goodhart and Payne, 1997). Others look at reversal pattern trades 
that require the trader to sell if some sequence of prices characteristic of the end of an 
upward trend appeared – the well-known “head-and-shoulders” or “double top” 
patterns for example. Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) use local smoothing process to 
identify ten patterns often cited in technical analysis texts in a large sample of US 
stocks. They show that the statistical characteristics of the time series of price changes 
after the occurrence of familiar chart patterns, but stop short of claiming that this 
leads to profitable trading rules. Zhou and Dong (2004) use fuzzy logic to identify 
these patterns, but find no excess profits from trading. The study of the head and 
shoulders pattern in currencies by Chang and Osler (1999) does find some excess 
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profits, but for only two of the six currencies examined, and in both these cases profits 
from the pattern based rules are lower than those from mechanical moving average 
rules. 
The balance of this academic research does not mirror the relative way technical 
analysis techniques are viewed by practitioners in practice. From a small survey, 
Batchelor and Kwan (2000) find that the pattern–based methods, including use of 
support and resistance trendlines, are used much more often than moving average 
rules and other indicators, in both stock markets and currency markets. The attraction 
of technical indicators for academic research seems to be that the rules are easily 
formalised, while identification of chart patterns and support and resistance levels is a 
more subjective business. Also, much early academic research was aimed at testing 
market efficiency rather than understanding or evaluating technical analysts, when the 
realism of the trading rule is not an issue.  
To put our own study in context, and to define some terms, consider the path of prices 
shown on Figure 1. The price has hit a trough at time T1 and price P1. It has then 
risen in a bull phase until it reaches a peak at time T2 and price P2.  P2 can be 
regarded as a resistance level.  The price then experiences a reversal and moves into a 
bear phase until another trough is reached at time T3 and price P3. P3 can be 
regarded as a support level for the price, which is then starting to turn up into another 
bull phase. The fall from (T2, P2) to (T3, P3) is termed a retracement of the bull 
phase (T1, P1) to (T2, P2). Any subsequent reversal into a bull phase, such as a rise 
from (T3, P3) to (T4, P4) is termed a projection of the previous bull phase (T1, P1) to 
(T2, P2). 
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Figure 1 – Bull and bear phases, retracement and projection 
 
This kind of chart can form the basis for a trading rule so long as well-defined support 
and resistance levels exist, and can be predicted ex ante. The trading rule would 
require selling as the price approached the resistance level from below but failed to 
break it, and buying as the price fell near to the support level. If sufficient traders 
agreed on where resistance and support lay, and followed this strategy, their beliefs 
would become self-fulfilling, and price trends would be arrested at the resistance and 
support levels.   
In a benchmark study, Osler (2000) asked currency analysts at six major US banks to 
supply daily support and resistance levels for three major currencies from January 
1996 to March 1998. There are three interesting features of her data. First, quoted 
support and resistance levels are very often “round numbers”. Second, for any 
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individual firm the levels did not change dramatically from day to day, so there is 
some consistency in choices about support and resistance levels. Third, there was only 
limited agreement among analysts about where these critical price levels lay, 
suggesting that a variety of rules were used to determine these levels. In spite of this 
heterogeneity, Osler (2000) finds that exchange rates “bounce” off the levels quoted 
by the analysts much more often than from randomly chosen levels. This strongly 
suggests that reversal trades are indeed triggered when prices approach support and 
resistance levels and that there is some rationale for analysts choosing these levels.  
The phenomenon of price clustering around round numbers – that is, price levels 
ending in 0 or 5, or 00 and 50 - has been confirmed in the currency markets (de 
Grauwe and Decupere, 1992) and in stock indices (Donaldson and Kim, 1993; Ley 
and Varian, 1994; Cyree and Domian, 1999; Mitchell, 2001). These are often called 
“psychological barriers”, but Osler (2001) shows that there are good market-driven 
reasons expecting support and resistance at round numbers. Many currency trades are 
made in response to conditional retail orders (for example, stop-loss and limit orders) 
and these are very often set at round number exchange rates. Option strike prices are 
almost invariably round number values of the underlying currency or index, and cash 
prices around the strike price are liable to induce exercise or hedging trades in the 
cash market. 
Imagine then that we have just passed time T3 on Figure 1, and the price has started to 
rise above P3. How can the likely target resistance level P4 be forecast? In addition to 
looking for round numbers above P3, technical analysts have two systematic ways of 
determining support and resistance levels. One is to identify them as previous peaks 
and troughs, the minima or maxima achieved over some window of past price data. 
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The longer the window, the wider the band between support and resistance, and 
analysts typically quote a number of possible support and resistance levels, 
corresponding to different window sizes. The rationale for this approach is that the 
recent maxima and minima reflect price levels at which sellers and buyers have 
caused reversals in price in the past. Unless there has been some fundamental change 
in sentiment we might therefore expect them to enter the market again at these levels 
in the future. As a variant on this method, analysts may draw “trendlines” through 
recent minima and maxima, and base their support and resistance levels on an 
extrapolation of this channel. Again, the longer the window of past data used, the 
wider the band between support and resistance. The rationale here is that the trend 
accounts for likely changes in fundamental sentiment. 
The second way that analysts determine the target price P4 – and the focus of this 
paper – is by means of what we term “magic numbers”. Many analysts believe that 
the ratio of the size of the prospective rise in price ⏐P4-P3⏐ to the size of the 
preceding fall ⏐P3-P2⏐ is not random, but is likely to lie close to one of a small 
number of critical ratios. These retracement ratios themselves may be either “whole 
numbers” like 0.5, 1, 1.5 etc., or may be one of the set of Fibonacci ratios 0.382, 
0.618, 1.618, etc. Similarly, many analysts believe that the ratio of the prospective 
rise in price ⏐P4-P3⏐ to the previous bull phase price rise ⏐P2-P1⏐ is likely to be 
close to one of these key ratios. Some analysts argue that ratios of durations of 
successive runs, say  ⏐T4-T3⏐/⏐T3-T2⏐ may also follow some Fibonacci rule.  
A Fibonacci series is an ordered set of numbers  f1 ,f2, f3, f4, …, fi-1, fi, … where terms 
from f3 onwards are the sum of the two preceding numbers in the series. The 
9 
Fibonacci ratio is φ = limi→∞ (fi/fi-1) = 1.618034… . Related ratios are φ2 =  limi→∞ 
(fi/fi-2) = 2.618034… , φ3 = 4.236068, and their inverses 0.618034 …, 0.381966.., and 
0.236068. The number φ occurs naturally in the geometry of the pentagon, and in 
spiral forms found in botany and biology (Basin, 1963).  All textbooks in technical 
analysis devote considerable space to description and discussion of these ratios. For 
example, Murphy (2000) asserts that 0.5 and 0.618 are the key ratios for determining 
target prices in retracements. Other ratios include 0.382, 0.786, 1, 1.5. 1.618,2 and 
2.618.  Figure 2 lists a few of the many citations of Fibonacci ratios in technical 
comments by respected market sources, including the Financial Times, Reuters, Dow 
Jones and Standard and Poors Money Market Services, covering bond, stock, forex 
and commodity markets during just three unexceptional days in 2004.  
Figure 2 – Fibonacci ratios in the market, 6-8 October 2004 
“Technical analysis suggests the U.S. dollar's near-term bias against
the Singapore dollar has improved after it clearly rose above Fibonacci
resistance at S$1.6887, which is 50% retracement of the fall from Sept.
28, in Wednesday's Asian session”
Singapore Dlr Down Late On Weak Yen, High Oil; Bonds Flat, Dow
Jones International News (6th October 2004)
“The 112-25 level represents a 61.8% Fibonacci retracement from the
decline from the recent high to the session low, said Kosar. The 113
handle is roughly the low from Sept. 24”
Debt Futures Review: Slight Pullback While Awaiting Jobs Data, Dow
Jones Commodities Service (7th October 2004)
“While Dec coffee futures have been in a minor downtrend off the Sept.
27 peak of 86.40, for now key Fibonacci retracement support has not
been broken. Looking at the rally from the Aug. 16 low at 67.90 to the
Sept. 27 peak, 61.8% of those gains comes in at roughly 75.00
even…Conversely, if a breakdown is seen and Fibonacci support at
75.00 falls, a fresh wave of long liquidation is likely”
Nybot Dec Coffee Holds Support For Now, Dow Jones Commodities
Service (7th October 2004)
“We have been looking at a Fibonacci (technical) extension of $52.91,
which was just breached on Thursday, that could be a potential top,"
said a New York broker”
NYMEX crude softer, but holds above $52, Reuters News (8th October
2004)
“RES 5: 116.56 61.8% of 111.00 to 120.00
SUP 3: 114.94 50.0% of 116.18 to 113.69
COMMENTARY: Bear-divergence on daily studies continues to
favour a move towards the 115.34 congestion area. A break below
there puts the 115.12 low back into focus and targets move to 114.94
Fibonacci level”
MNI Eurozone Bond Technicals, Market News International (8th
October 2004)
“The 61.8% Fibonacci retracement at $1.8005 is also important and a
possible price target”
Charting Europe: Cable to Stage Recovery Vs Dollar, Dow Jones
Capital Markets Report (8th October 2004)
“For upside targets on NYMEX crude Walter Zimmermann at United
Energy looked at equality based projections, pegging the 1.618 percent
Fibonacci projection at $69.45”
Crude tops charts but spike above $70 may flag top, Reuters News (8th
October 2004)
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While there is clear logic in the use of round numbers or recently realised extreme 
values as support and resistance levels, it is not at all clear why the ratio⏐P4-
P3⏐/⏐P3-P2⏐ should be 0.618 rather than say 0.816. One possible argument is 
aesthetic. The length of a Fibonacci-determined bull run “looks right” on a chart 
relative to the previous bear phase – neither too short nor too long – and only at this 
point will sellers feel the market has risen too far. Enthusiasts for “the golden ratio” φ  
have claimed to see it in the proportions of classical architecture and art, and it was 
very consciously used by the 20th century architect Le Corbusier. However, many 
speculations about φ appear to be the result of visual “data mining” and wishful 
thinking – a judicious choice of where exactly to start measuring the base of the 
Parthenon, for example, or the selection of only those artworks that display prominent 
verticals about 61.8% from their left hand edge. The debate about the status of φ in art 
is summarised in the entertaining and informative monograph of Livio (2002). At a 
more fundamental level, the pioneering psychologist Gustav Fechner (1876) 
conducted experiments that seemed to show that people had preferences for rectangles 
with sides approximately in the ratio 1: φ . This idea was challenged by Godkewitsch 
(1974) but has since found some support (see for example McManus, 1980).  
Another argument for using Fibonacci ratios in determining support and resistance 
levels is purely empirical, or possibly supernatural. Early in the history of stock 
market indexes developed by Charles Dow, editor of the Wall Street Journal from 
1900-1902 and part-owner, commentators viewed their evolution as a series of nested 
irregular “waves”. A central tenet of Dow Theory, as codified by Nelson (1903), 
Hamilton (1922), and Rhea (1932) is that the market has a cycle wave that lasts 
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between 2 and 10 years, interrupted by shorter term primary (about 1 year), secondary 
and tertiary fluctuations. Dow theory also contains some statements about the likely 
shape of these waves. Hamilton, for example, asserts that “secondary movements 
retrace 33% to 66% of the primary move, with 50% being the typical amount”. 
Cowles (1934) tests the value of Hamilton’s stock tips, which to some extent follow 
from Dow Theory, but with negative results. Hamilton’s reputation as a forecaster is 
rescued by the reappraisal in Brown, Goetzmann and Kumar (1998).  
Elliott (1938) introduced a rather different wave theory of the stock market. His basic 
idea is that the market typically rises in five waves or phases (bull, bear, bull, bear, 
bull), and then falls in three phases (bear, bull, bear). Moreover, this pattern is self-
similar and can be seen at all data frequencies, so that within each long term wave 
there are five rising and three falling phases, and within each of these are similar 
patterns: and so on. So Elliott Waves might be observed in the century long term 
stock market history, in a chart of last year’s fluctuations, or in today’s chart of 5-
minute price bars.   
Figure 3 shows an Elliott Wave pattern superimposed on two months data on the 
NASDAQ index. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 show the turning points in the up-trend, 
and the letters A, B, C show the turning points on the downtrend. Within the major 
waves we also show some minor waves. In a later newsletter Elliott (1940) further 
claimed that the ratios of price and time retracements and projections in successive 
waves were likely to conform to Fibonacci ratios. So in Figure 3, we might expect the 
retracement ratio of the price range between turning points 2 and 3 to be a Fibonacci 
ratio multiple of the range between points 1 and 2. Or we might expect the projection 
ratio of the range from B to C to be a Fibonacci ratio multiple of the range between 
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points 5 and A.  Elliott believed that this followed from some underlying 
mathematical principle driving a wide range of physical and sociological phenomena, 
and published his beliefs in a book entitled “Natures Law – the Secret of the 
Universe” (Elliott, 1946). The Elliott Wave was subsequently much elaborated and 
popularised from the 1970s onwards by Prechter and Frost (2000, 10th ed.), with 
considerable success. Fibonacci ratios are mentioned more often than moving 
averages in the Batchelor and Kwan (2000) survey of techniques used by practising 
analysts.  
 
Figure 3 – Some Elliott Waves in the NASDAQ 
 
Some adherents of wave theory use methods attributed by Gann (1942, 1949), though 
these are less popular than Elliott Wave analysis. In a long and apparently successful 
career as a stock tipster and seller of trading systems, Gann promulgated the idea that 
prices retraced to some predictable “round fraction” of the previous trend – usually 
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0.5, but possibly any multiple of 1/8. He applied these and other “market geometry” 
techniques to predict the timing as well as the level of likely turning points. There 
seems to be no logic for the ratios used by Gann, who found justifications for his 
many different trading systems in numerology, astrology and Biblical arcana.  
The idea that prices retrace to a Fibonacci ratio or round fraction of the previous trend 
clearly lacks any scientific rationale. However, this phenomenon is well bedded into 
the mind of the marketplace, and so may be self-fulfilling. In the essays collected in 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), the authors note that in an uncertain 
environment people tend to “anchor” decisions to available numbers, regardless of 
relevance. In the classic Tversky and Kahneman (1974) experiment, a number is 
chosen at random by spinning a wheel of fortune, and subjects are asked to whether 
the percentage of African nations belonging to the United Nations is higher or lower 
than that number, and to estimate the exact percentage. There is a high correlation 
between the number from the wheel and the percentage estimate, even though the 
events are obviously unconnected and the choice of number random. The mechanism 
of anchoring is disturbingly close to the environment of the trader. In the language of 
Chapman and Johnson (2002), subjects (traders) are presented (by technical analysts) 
with a salient but uninformative number (a Fibonacci ratio) before making a judgment 
(price target). So it is simply human nature for traders to take the technical support 
and resistance levels as starting points for thinking about price targets, regardless of 
their logic.  
Most people are also subject to the “illusion of control”, and confronted with random 
events or time series will claim to see patterns rather than admit to the existence of 
coincidence or randomness. This is particularly acute in business environments where 
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an appearance of competence must be maintained. Fenton O’Creevy et. al. (1998) 
report an experiment in which professional traders were asked to use a computer 
mouse to control a dot on the screen. In reality, the movements of the dot were 
random and the mouse was not even connected to the computer. But the traders 
happily reported that they were learning a rule linking the two, and controlling the 
dot.  
Regardless of whether Fibonacci ratios are natural laws or optical illusions, the 
proposition that stock prices retrace to such levels is unusual among technical trading 
rules, in the sense that it can be clearly formulated in numeric terms, and is potentially 
testable. Provided, that is, that we can identify the peaks and troughs the price series. 
3. IDENTIFYING PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN THE DOW 
The data for our analysis are daily observations on the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) for 22,194 trading days between January 1915 and June 2003.  From January 
1914 to October 1928 we have only closing prices for the index. Thereafter we use 
daily open, high, low and close prices. The index does not include dividends, since we 
are interested in identifying cycles that might be observed by traders rather than 
computing returns to any trading rule.  
Dating the peaks and troughs in nonstationary time series has long been of concern to 
business cycle analysts, and in recent years their methods have been applied also to 
identifying cycles in the stock market. The problem is to find some way of filtering 
out noise from the time series so that underlying bull and bear market trends can be 
revealed, and the peak and trough prices and dates accurately identified. A technical 
analyst would do this by eyeballing the chart, and marking trends with a ruler, or the 
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line drawing tool on some software package. We need a more systematic method that 
ensures turnings points are identified in a consistent way throughout the time series, 
and that makes explicit the rules by which the turning points are chosen.   
There are a number of ways to approach to the problem, depending on how much 
structure is imposed on the underlying time series.  
The first is a simple filter rule. Suppose that we are in a bull market, and the highest 
price achieved so far occurred at time t.  If subsequently the cumulative fall in price 
from the high is more than some threshold percentage (say 10%) then we can say that 
a peak occurred at t, and the price series has switched from a bull to a bear phase. A 
similar rule can be used to identify troughs. This approach is used in Chauvet and 
Potter (2000), and in Lunde and Timmerman (2004) who investigate symmetric and 
asymmetric filters in the range 10%-20%. Lunde and Timmerman elaborate and 
formalise the concept further (Table 1).  Narrow filters generate many turning points, 
while broad filters discount short term reversals and generate a smaller number of 
turning points and hence longer bull and bear trends. Even this simple approach 
requires some subjective judgment about what constitutes a reasonable decomposition 
of the price series into trend and noise components. As it stands the rule is liable to 
generate larger numbers of turning points at times of high market volatility, so a 
variable filter size might give more plausible results.  Levy (1971) used a more 
dynamic form of percentage switching.  The highest (lowest) point preceding a 
decline (advance), with the filter bVac += , where a and b are constants, fixed by 
Levy as a = 0 and b = 6, and V is 131-day percentage volatility.  Levy percentage 
filter was thus completely driven by volatility and made no use of constants.   
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Table 1 – Percentage Turning Point Filter (Lunde and Timmerman, 2004) 
 
Secondly, a filter might take the form of a time filter.  Swing charts (Gann, 1942, 
1949) are practitioner rules that switch state based on duration based filter of price 
moves.  For a swing to turn up (down) a market must have a x bars where the high 
(low) of the bar is higher (lower) than the previous bar and the low (high) is higher 
(lower) than the previous bar, where 3 is the normal value of x.  A choice needs to be 
made as to how to treat inside and outside bars, bars that are enveloped by or 
envelope the previous bar.  They can be ignored or swing changes can be based on the 
close prices.  Swing charts are perhaps analogous to Okun (1970)’s now popular rule 
of thumb that two or more quarter’s negative growth constitutes a recession and more 
loosely to duration dependence.  There is no academic literature on this switching 
It is a market state dummy variable taking the value 1 (0) if the stock 
market is in a bull (bear) market at time t.   Measuring time on a 
discrete scale, assume suppose that at t0 the market is at a local 
maximum, meaning Pmax = Pt0, where Pt0 is price at t0.  The threshold 
filter that triggers a switch between bull and bear states is c and τ ≥ 1 is 
a stopping time variable defined by 
})1({min maxmax,...1 00 PcPPP ii ttni −<∨≥= ++=τ
 
When the first condition is fulfilled the local maximum in the current 
bull state is updated 
ττ +== + 0maxmax ,0 ttPP t
 
The continuation of the bull regime between t0 and t0+τ means that Ito = 
… = Ito+τ = 1.  Conversely, if max)1(0 PcP it −<+ is met, fulfilling the 
second condition, a bear market is defined as existing between t0 and 
t0+τ  thus Itmax = … = Ito+τ = 0.  As per bull markets,  the above holds 
for bear markets as: 
ττ +== + 0minmin ,0 ttPP t  
})1({min minmin,...1 minmin PcPPP ii ttni −<∨≥= ++=τ  
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approach but their role in industry, simplicity and their claimed robustness makes of 
them interesting for future research.   
A third approach is to apply a more complicated heuristic that enforces some 
desirable features on the turning points and market phases. A good example is the 
procedure developed for stock market analysis by Pagan and Sossounov (2003). This 
is derived from the pioneering paper on the determination of business cycle peaks and 
troughs by Bry and Boschan (1971), which in turn automated the task performed by 
the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee (see Burns and Mitchell, 1946). The 
steps in the Pagan and Sossounov (2003) procedure are shown on Table 2. The 
parameters used reflect the monthly frequency of the price data used in their study, 
and are explicitly selected to yield cycles consistent with Dow Theory. Provisional 
peaks and troughs are identified as the highest and lowest points in a moving k-month 
(8-month) window. Any cases where there are successive peaks or troughs are 
resolved, and any odd effects that occur at the start or the end of the series, where the 
window width necessarily shrinks, are also removed. Finally, to address the problem 
of excessive numbers of cycles being generated at times of high volatility, any cycles 
or trends that look too short (cycles less than 16 months, phases less than 4 months) 
are removed, unless they correspond to an obvious market crash. Similar methods are 
used by Edwards, Biscarri and de Gracia (2003) and Gonzalez, Powell and Shi 
(2003).  
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Table 2 – Pagan-Sossounov (2003) procedure for identifying turning points 
 
1. Determination of initial turning points in raw data.  
Determination of initial turning points in raw data by choosing local peaks / 
troughs, as occurring when they are the highest /lowest,  values in a window 8 
months on either side of the date. 
Enforcement of alternation of turns by selecting highest of multiple peaks (or 
lowest of multiple troughs, . 
2. Censoring operations.  
Elimination of turns within 6 months of beginning and end of series. 
Elimination of peaks (or troughs), at both ends of series which are lower (or 
higher) than most recent. 
Elimination of cycles whose duration is less than 16 months. 
Elimination of phases whose duration is less than 4 months, unless fall/rise 
exceeds 20%, . 
3. Statement of final turning points 
 
As formally expressed in relation to monthly data by Edwards et al (2003), there 
is a peak at price p and time t if ],...,,...,[ 8118 ++−− >< ttttt ppppp and there is a 
trough at price p and time t if ],...,,...,[ 8118 ++−− <> ttttt ppppp  
We can alternatively express this as peaks occurring when 
),...,,,...,max( 8118 ++−−= ttttt ppppp and troughs when 
),...,,,...,min( 8118 ++−−= ttttt ppppp .   
We have formally expressed the written definition given by Pagan and Sossounov 
of phase filtering as follows, where D is duration, A is the amplitude (phase 
returns), T is the turning point being identified, t is the time of the turning point 
and Ft is a dummy variable, where Ft = 1 when Aphase > min(Aphase) and Ft = 0 
when Aphase < min(Aphase)  
])min()1)(min()[min( tphasetphase FAFDphase +−=    
Where 1−−= TTphase ttD ; ( )min( phaseD =4 months) and 
1
1
−
−−=
T
TT
phase p
ppA ; 
( )min( phaseA  =20%) 
A sixteen-month minimum peak (trough) to peak (trough) cycle rule is imposed, 
rather than the original Bry Boschan fifteen months.  We can formally express the 
definition given by Pagan and Sossounov as follows 
2 where
months 16)min(
−−== PPpeakcyclepeakcycle ttDD   2 where months 16)min( −−== TTetroughcycletroughcycl ttDD  
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The choice of an eight month rolling window more restrictive than the original Bry 
and Boschan choice of six months. Pagan and Sossounov (2003) accept the lack of 
clarity as to how one selects an appropriate value in the context of asset prices. For 
example, Gonzalez et al (C) identify all peaks (troughs) that are higher (lower) than 
all points five months on either side – the highest (lowest) of multiple peaks(troughs) 
are then selected.  Whilst no justification is given by Pagan and Sossounov for eight 
months in particular to be used either side of the window, there is one given for the 
alteration of the minimum time to be spent in each phase.  Pagan and Sossounov 
(2003) describe Dow Theory as amongst the “oldest formal literature emphasising 
bull and bear markets”.  As their work “shares an interest with Dow theorists a 
fundamental interest in primary movements”, Dow’s guidelines steered the remaining 
parameterisation of the model.  Dow’s suggestion of minimum phase durations of 
three months formed the basis of final choice of four months.  Yet the impact of fat-
tails would mean that this filter would ignore some of the important, yet short-lived, 
swings in price.  The 1987 crash only lasted three months for example.  They felt that 
reducing the four months to three would catch too many spurious cycles and so the 
minimum phase requirement was amended.  Where there is a swing of at least twenty 
per cent, the four month filter is overridden.  Gonzalez et al (2003) were also 
uncomfortable with the blanket requirement that each equity market phase have a 
duration of at least five months.  They instead replaced it with a restriction entirely 
based on minimum returns – a minimum 10% phase rule.  Whilst in the context of 
GDP based business cycle identification, Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1995) also 
altered the amplitude requirement of the BB approach, imposing a minimum 
amplitude of one standard error of the monthly growth rate.  These are all of course 
also blanket requirements, just ones that differ from the original 1971 assumptions.  
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The strength of the Pagan and Sossounov approach in censoring phases lies in it 
having a phase filter conditional on either phase amplitude or duration.   
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) refers to Dow’s definition of a primary bull market as 
being one that lasts, on average, for at least two years (yet can be interrupted by 
secondary corrections).  It was felt that a two-year restriction would disallow the 
identification of primary corrections, which would likely be shorter in duration than 
their bull counterparts in equity markets. With Dow Theory suggesting that a 
complete cycle lasts one year at the minimum and the original Bry Boschan approach 
giving fifteen months, sixteen months was settled on.  This results in a neat 16, 8, 4 
parameterisation of the duration parameters for long term equity cycles.   
Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) use a fourth, and apparently more objective, method 
to identify peaks, troughs and local reversal patterns in high frequency data on US 
stocks. Turning points are identified as points with zero time derivatives in kernel 
regression functions fitted to moving windows of closing price data. Although this 
looks less arbitrary than the heuristic approach, in practice many ad hoc adjustments 
and subjective judgments have to be made. Successive peaks and troughs, and points 
of inflexion have to be removed. As with the Pagan-Sossounov procedure, the 
window size has to be determined, depending on the desired number of cycles. 
Interestingly, the window sizes automatically chosen by their regression package on 
the basis of an estimate of the noise-signal ratio (large) produced too few turning 
points in the opinion of an expert technical analyst who audited the Lo, Mamaysky 
and Wang (2000) procedure. The authors therefore narrowed the window size to bring 
the results closer to market practice.  
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The fifth possibility is to identify turning points by some Markov switching model of 
the type popularised in business cycle analysis by Hamilton (1989), and compared to 
the heuristic approach by Harding and Pagan (2003a). The idea is to characterise 
stock returns as coming from either a bull state (positive mean, low variance) or a 
bear state (negative mean, high variance), with some high probability of staying in 
each state once the bull or bear market is under way. The means, variances and 
probabilities can be estimated from time series data on prices, and from these we can 
infer the probability that the market was in a bull or bear state at each point in the time 
series. Dates at which the probability of being in the bull state fall from above 0.5 to 
below 0.5 count as provisional peaks, and dates when this probability cuts 0.5 from 
below count as troughs. Bodman and Crosby (2000) argue that these regime switching 
models are “non-judgmental”, and in his comment on Harding and Pagan (2003a) 
Hamilton (2003) similarly agues that they capture the underlying structure of the time 
series. However, as Harding and Pagan (2003b) point out, the objectivity is more 
apparent than real. Choices have to be made about the number of states, the time 
series process driving the means and variances, whether the transition probabilities are 
time varying and if so whether they are dependent on the duration of the regime. 
Guidolin and Timmerman (2004), for example, successfully parameterise 3-regime 
models of returns to UK bond and stock markets. Rather importantly, the results of 
these switching models may well violate common sense, in that the switch points need 
not occur at local peaks or troughs.  Harding and Pagan (2003b) also argue that 
Markov cycle models are not intuitively transparent.  There is a lack of any intuitive 
meaning in the estimated parameters over and above the knowledge that they 
represent the probability of being in a state.   
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We have chosen to identify turning points in the Dow using the approach of Pagan 
and Sossounov (2004), with two modifications. One is that we use daily high and low 
price series as potential highs and lows respectively, rather than the closing price. 
This recognises that technical analysts in practice employ charts with daily bars rather 
than single points.  It does make a difference to cycle dating. For example, a trough in 
the Dow identified at a level of 416.2 in October 1957 (the lowest low) would not 
have been identified by the Pagan-Sossounov algorithm, instead being put at 424.2 
(the lowest close) in December 1957. A second is that we add the censoring rule that 
any  peaks (troughs) are greater (less) than their preceding trough (peak), to ensure 
appropriate alternation.  This is in addition to the alternation censor specified by 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003), which simply ensures that peaks (troughs) are followed 
by troughs (peaks).   
As noted by Biscarri and de Gracia (2001) and Edwards et. al. (2003), the Pagan-
Sossounov procedure is quite sensitive to the window size used for initial 
identification of turning points. One could parameterise the Pagan and Sossounov 
model in such a way to segment a long time series into a handful of extremely large 
phases or several hundred small phases. As an illustration, our model with Pagan and 
Sossounov’s parameters (a 16-month window with a minimum cycle length of 16 
months) identifies 46 turning points in the Dow between 1915 and 2003. Halving the 
window size increases the number of turning points to 60. Combining this smaller 
window size with a minimum cycle of 8 months rather than 16 increases the number 
of turning points further to 72.   
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Table 3 – Comparison post-war turning points with Pagan-Sossounov (2003) 
 
Peaks 
Batchelor-Ramyar Pagan-Sossounov
29 May 1946 May-46
14 June 1948 Jun-48
05 January 1953 Dec-52
09 April 1956 Jul-56
04 January 1960 Jul-59
15 November 1961 Dec-61
09 February 1966 Jan-66
02 December 1968 Nov-68
28 April 1971 Apr-71
11 January 1973 Dec-72
22 September 1976 Dec-76
11 September 1978
27 April 1981 Nov-80
30 November 1983 Jun-83
25 August 1987 Aug-87
May-90
03 June 1992
Jan-94
14 January 2000
Troughs
Batchelor-Ramyar Pagan-Sossounov
30 October 1946 Feb-48
14 June 1949 Jun-48
15 September 1953 Aug-53
22 October 1957 Dec-57
25 October 1960 Oct-60
25 June 1962 Jun-62
10 October 1966 Sep-66
26 May 1970 Jun-70
23 November 1971 Nov-71
09 December 1974 Sep-74
01 March 1978 Feb-78
27 March 1980
09 August 1982 Jul-82
25 July 1984 May-84
20 October 1987 Nov-87
Oct-90
05 October 1992
Jun-94
21 September 2001
 
Table shows dates of peaks and troughs from applying our heuristic filter to daily data in the year 
1945-2001, compared to the chronology of Pagan and Sossounov (2003). Shaded area show times 
when there are more than three months difference between turning points in the two series. 
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The algorithm is also sensitive to data frequency. Pagan and Sossounov (2003) used 
monthly S&P returns, while the Batchelor-Ramyar procedure is applied using daily 
data. Adjusting their censoring parameters for daily data using a 252 day trading year, 
we find 46 cycles from monthly data, 52 from weekly and 47 from daily. Table 3 
compares the dating of the post WWII cycles from their monthly data with the dates 
found using our method for daily data. There is general agreement about timing until 
the 1980s. Of the 16 cycles identified by Pagan and Sossounov, our dates for troughs 
are within three months of theirs in 12 cases, and in the case of peaks we agree in 11 
cases. The concordance breaks down completely at the end of the sample, and we 
have one additional cycle in 1978-80.  
The cycles found by Pagan and Sossounov are of roughly the same periodicity as the 
underlying economic business cycle. This is not relevant to our purposes, since we 
want to mimic the cycles seen by, and possibly caused by, short term traders. The 
base-case parameters for our study of retracement and projection ratios have therefore 
been chosen to filter out much less noise than the Pagan-Sossounov model. The initial 
rolling window on either side of each turning point is defined as 21 trading days 
(approximately one calendar month). The minimum cycle duration is defined as 42 
trading days (approximately two calendar months). The minimum phase duration is 
set to 10 trading days (approximately two calendar weeks), unless absolute returns 
exceed 5%. This results in 430 identified turning points in the Dow series.  Following 
the lead of Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000), a qualified technical analyst confirmed 
the realism of the patterns produced. However, it will clearly be necessary to test the 
sensitivity of any results to changes in these parameter values.  
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Table 4 – Summary statistics for bull and bear phases 
 
The characteristics of the cycles are summarised in Table 4. Typical (median) bear 
phases last about 42 days, and bull phases 50 days. As would be expected given the 
long term upward trend in the Dow, the mean (log) return in bull phases is a little 
higher than in bear phases. Bear phases are also on average shorter than bull phases 
(52 days versus 63 days). Both price amplitude and duration are positively skewed. 
The mean log-return in a bull phase, for example is 15.1% as against a median of 
11.4%. The picture is therefore one of a large number of relatively short-lived and 
small cycles and a long tail of quite long-lived bull and bear trends. 
Phase Dimension units Minimum 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Maximum
Bear Price Level index points 2.9 22.6 60.8 156.5 217.6 3288.0
log Price 100*log price 0.3 7.7 11.4 15.1 18.2 79.9
% of Price % of price 0.3 6.2 9.7 13.2 15.4 105.2
Duration days 3 23 42 52 64 337
Bull Price Level index points 5.6 26.0 66.1 161.0 236.8 2455.0
log Price 100*log price 3.7 9.0 12.9 16.2 20.9 79.9
% of Price % of price 0.3 6.4 9.5 12.4 14.7 54.8
Duration days 7 30 50 63 75 337
The table shows statistics on the distribution of the 430 bull and bear phases identified by our heuristic 
from daily data on the Dow in the period January 1915 – June 2003. Note that all price changes in 
bear phases are negative, and the table shows their absolute values 
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4. BOOTSTRAP ANALYSIS OF RETRACEMENT AND PROJECTION 
RATIOS 
We aim to test hypotheses of the form  
R ∈ f ± ε 
where R is some ratio measured from the identified turning points in the Dow, f is a 
round number or Fibonacci ratio, and ε is a small bandwidth around f.  
We have measured two types of ratio R, retracements and projections. Recall from the 
discussion of Figure 1 that a retracement is the ratio of one phase to the immediately 
preceding phase. There are therefore two types of retracement – a bull retracement 
when the market switches from a falling to a rising trend, and a bear retracement, 
when the market switches from a rising to a falling trend. A projection is the ratio of 
one phase to the most recent similar phase. Again, there are bull projections – the 
ratio of one uptrend to the previous uptrend – and bear projections. The size of the 
trend is measured in two ways, by price and time. A bull time projection is the ratio of 
the duration of one uptrend to the duration of the previous uptrend, both measured in 
trading days. A bull price projection is the ratio of the change in price through one 
uptrend to the change in price in the previous uptrend. For retracements we look at the 
absolute value of the price ranges, so all ratios are positive. Analysts chart prices and 
calculate changes in various ways. Some look at simple price bar charts. Some plot 
the bars on a logarithmic scale. Some calculate ratios using percentage changes rather 
than absolute price changes. For all price retracements and projections we have 
calculated the ratios in three ways, using differences in prices, differences in log-
prices, and percentage differences in prices. In total we calculate 2 types (retracement 
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and projection) x 2 trends (bull and bear) x 4 dimensions and price measures (time, 
and price, log price and percentage change in price)  = 16 ratios.    
We compare the observed values of R with the conjectured round number ratios f = 
0.5, 1, 1.5, and with the Fibonacci ratios f = 0.382, 0.618, 0.786, 1.382, 1.618, 2.618 
and 4.236, making 10 hypothesized values in all. Initially we look for values of R in a 
band in the ranges f ± ε where e is taken as 0.025, so as to keep a clear distance 
between adjacent ranges.  
The voluminous literature on empirical characteristic of stock returns suggests that the 
process driving the mean return is unstable, generally close to white noise, and 
punctuated by the manias and panics that lead to the best-defined bull and bear 
phases. There is however positive serial correlation between daily volatility, measured 
either by the daily price range, or by the close-to-close range. Cont (2001) provides a 
nice summary of these stylized facts and their implications for the returns distribution. 
One implication is that there is no recognizable theoretical distribution for the ratios 
we have calculated, so testing will have to rely on bootstrap distributions. The 
existence of local trends and second moment serial correlation means that a simple 
bootstrap is inappropriate since key properties of the returns would be destroyed by 
simple randomization.  
Some block bootstrap method is necessary, and we have used the stationary bootstrap 
of Politis and Romano (1994).  The pseudo-series from our sample of size n = 22194, 
are generated by resampled blocks, starting at a random observation number N and 
containing a random number of observations b, where the length of each block is 
drawn from a geometric distribution with parameter p.  In common with the circular 
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bootstrap (Politis and Romano, 1992), the stationary bootstrap arranges the data 
circularly so that P1 follows Pn when the required block allocating a block size b 
starting at observation N > n-b.  Unlike standard resampling or the moving blocks 
bootstrap, the stationary characteristics of the empirical series are maintained by the 
stationary bootstrap. Note that what is resampled is the whole vector of open, high, 
low and close prices. The resampled series thus retains the vectors four return 
distributions of the original series, so for example the serial correlation between 
successive daily ranges is approximately preserved. As with all block bootstrap 
methods there are discontinuities at the joins of blocks, but with our large sample size 
this is unlikely to bias the results. 
Figure 4 – Bootstrap distribution of bear price level retracements 
 
For each of 2000 bootstrap replications, a set of turning points is determined using our 
algorithm, and the corresponding values of the 16 retracement and projection ratios 
calculated.  Figure 4 shows the distribution of just one of these ratios in the actual 
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Distribution of empirical versus bootstrap price retracement ratios (the ratios of the 
amplitude in index points of a phase versus the preceding phase) 
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data – the bear retracement ratio in the price level – plotted against the distribution 
from the bootstrap experiments. If retracements were to specific levels, and were not 
randomly distributed, we would expect to see significant differences between actual 
and bootstrap distributions, with the actual data concentrated around round numbers 
or Fibonacci ratios. Looking at Figure 4 there are slightly more retracements at in the 
ranges 0.4-0.6, 1.2-1.4 and 2.4-2.6 than suggested by the bootstrap distribution. To 
test formally whether there is a significant difference between these histograms, Table 
5 shows values the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic testing the null hypothesis 
that the whole distribution of each of the 16 ratios does not match the bootstrap 
distribution.  The KS statistics suggest that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for 
most of our ratios, but the results do tend towards the probability that the empirical 
distributions match the bootstrap distributions. One of the 16 statistics is significant at 
90% and 14 statistics give at least a 50% chance that we can reject the null of 
inequality.  One the face of it this does not support the idea that market action causes 
unusual spikes in the distribution of price or duration ratios. 
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Table 5 – p-values from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality between actual and 
bootstrap distributions of ratios 
 
The table shows p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics testing for significant 
similarity between the distribution of each type of ratio in the Dow, and the 
corresponding distribution from 2000 random stationary bootstrap replications of the 
index series. Values over 0.90* indicate significance at the 90% level, and values over  
0.95** indicate significance at the 95% level. 
To test whether each specific ratio occurs more often than expected from the 
bootstrap distribution, we count the number of occurrences of the ratios within a band 
of size ε around each of the 10 hypothesized values f. The bandwidth ε has been set 
initially at 2.5%, and full results are set out in the following table. For each 
type/phase/dimension and each round number or Fibonacci ratio f we count the 
number of occurrences of the ratio in the interval f ± e where  e =  0.025. This is 
compared to the distribution of occurrences in 2000 random block bootstrap 
replications of the index series. The table shows the percentile of the actual number of 
occurrences in the bootstrap distribution. Values over .90 indicate significance at the 
90% level, and values over .95 indicate significance at the 95% level. Discounting the 
Phase Dimension Retracements Projections
Bear Price Level 0.727 0.458
log Price 0.567 0.576
Percentage price 0.634 0.838
Duration 0.865 0.806
Bull Price Level 0.692 0.877
log Price 0.409 0.698
Percentage price 0.676 0.605
Duration 0.940* 0.298
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results for the ratio 4.236, where there were few occurrences in the actual data or the 
bootstrap samples, only 15 of the 144 ratios exceed 0.90. This is only slightly more 
than the 14.4 that we would expect to observe under the null of equality between 
sample and bootstrap frequencies. Moreover, there is no consistency in the type of 
ratio or Fibonacci number at which these few significant results occur.  
It is of course possible that our results are an artefact of the parameters of our testing 
procedure. We have experimented with shorter (10 day) and longer (40 day) average 
block lengths in our bootstrap, as against the base case of 20 days. We have also 
conducted tests using narrower (.01) and broader (0.05) bands around the 
hypothesized ratio values as against the base case value for ε of .025.  None of these 
sensitivity tests undermine our basic, negative, result. 
Our conclusion must be that there is no significant difference between the frequencies 
with which price and time ratios occur in cycles in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
and frequencies which we would expect to occur at random in such a time series. In 
our introduction, we noted that empirical evidence from academic studies suggests 
that not all of technical analysis can be dismissed prima facie. The evidence from this 
paper suggests that the idea that round fractions and Fibonacci ratios occur in the Dow 
can be dismissed. 
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Table 6 – p-values testing retracement and projection ratios against round fraction and Fibonacci ratios 
 
For each type/phase/dimension and each round number or Fibonacci ratio f we count the number of occurrences of the ratio in the interval f ± ε where  ε =  0.025. This is 
compared to the distribution of occurrences in 2000 random block bootstrap replications of the index series. The table shows the percentile of the actual number of 
occurrences in the bootstrap distribution. Values over 0.90* indicate significance at the 90% level, and values over 0.95** indicate significance at the 95% level. 
Type Phase Dimension Ratios (f)
0.382 0.500 0.618 0.786 1.000 1.382 1.618 2.000 2.618 4.236
Retracement Bear Price Level 0.42 0.20 0.71 0.89 0.18 0.46 0.36 0.05 0.81 1.00**
log Price 0.99** 0.03 0.68 0.81 0.49 0.07 0.73 0.95** 0.30 0.33
% of Price 0.42 0.31 0.97** 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.86 0.10 0.22 0.80
Duration 0.88 0.22 0.71 0.76 0.83 0.02 0.03 0.40 0.18 0.42
Retracement Bull Price Level 0.26 0.40 1.00** 0.88 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.00 0.57 1.00**
log Price 0.95** 0.53 0.85 0.97** 0.21 0.65 0.67 0.87 0.16 0.75
% of Price 0.14 0.06 0.94* 0.35 0.22 0.00 0.74 0.24 0.00 0.30
Duration 0.50 0.02 0.35 0.64 0.87 0.31 0.31 0.04 0.72 0.82
Projection Bear Price Level 0.12 0.10 0.18 0.50 0.69 0.76 0.41 0.79 0.66 1.00**
log Price 0.82 0.07 0.87 0.69 0.35 0.89 0.62 0.67 0.06 1.00**
% of Price 0.41 0.65 0.54 0.88 0.64 0.00 0.50 0.75 1.00** 1.00**
Duration 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.98** 0.78 0.13 0.89 0.08 0.64 1.00**
Projection Bull Price Level 0.56 0.70 0.38 0.58 0.57 0.79 0.42 1.00** 1.00** 0.43
log Price 0.40 0.54 0.68 0.56 0.55 0.11 1.00** 1.00** 0.63 1.00**
% of Price 0.83 0.53 0.90* 0.74 0.41 0.92* 0.63 0.81 1.00** 1.00**
Duration 0.62 0.60 0.05 0.74 0.26 0.73 0.60 1.00** 1.00** 1.00**
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